well as love for one's parents, they configure these competing values differently. They disagree on which is more important. Confucians consider love for one's parents a priority higher than what Mohists would;
Mohists give priority to universal love. Because different ethics have different configurations of values, they present competing configured perspectives on the same moral issues such as whether one should love one's parents more than one loves anyone else. In other words, an ethics is a configured perspective; it incorporates different single-aspect perspectives that may compete or even be in conflict with one another.
Neither Confucians nor Mohists would object universal love and love for one's parents per se. But because these two kinds of love compete in the same person, they disagree on how much love a person should give to his or her parents and how much to others universally. That is to say, on issues like this one, Confucian ethics and Mohist ethics provide differently configured perspectives. The fact that both ethics embrace the values of universal love and love for parents does not entail that they as two ethics are compatible on the configuration of these values.
In order to further illustrate my point, let us take a look at another example, namely the moral values of filial piety and loyalty to the state (the "ruler"). Although both filial piety and loyalty are highly valued in Confucianism, pre-Qin Confucians gave filial piety a higher priority than loyalty to the state. The Analects places filial piety at the foundation of exercising humanity or ren (1.2). The Mencius gives us a good case in point. In the Mencius, Mencius's student Xian Qiumeng raises a question regarding people who in serving the state were "too busy with state affairs to care for their own parents." Mencius had to defend them, not by saying that serving the state was more important than caring for one's parents, but by saying that service to the country was the greatest act of filial piety (Mencius 5A:4). Mencius said:
The son's utmost act of filial piety is to honor his parents; the utmost act of honoring parents lies in supporting his parents with the entire country. Being the emperor's father is the highest honor; being supported with the entire country is the utmost form of support.
3 (Mencius, 5A:4) In saying so, Mencius was able to defend these people without giving up the priority of filial piety over loyalty. It is of course conceivable that a Confucian thinker could disagree with Mencius's defense and argue that these people may have misplaced some priorities and failed their filial duty. Nevertheless, the fact that Mencius uses the value of filial piety, not loyalty, to justify these people's behavior, proves that he ethics, as people have sometimes presumed. Amy, the 11-year-old girl in Gilligan's "rights and responsibilities study," wondered whether "to keep friendship or keep justice" when confronted with a moral dilemma; justice is not entirely out of the picture (Gilligan, 1982, p. 59 ). Gilligan's study suggests that development for both men and women entail an integration of rights and responsibilities through the discovery of the complementarity of these disparate views:
For women, the integration of rights and responsibilities takes place through an understanding of the psychological logic of relationships. This understanding tempers the self-destructive potential of a self-critical morality by asserting the need of all persons for care. For men, recognition through experience of the need for more active responsibility in taking care corrects the potential indifference of a morality of noninterference and turns attention from the logic to the consequences of choice. (Gilligan, 1982, p. 100 ; italics added)
Gilligan's study shows that, by developing a post-conventional ethical understanding, women come to see the violence inherent in inequality, and men come to see the limitations of the concept of justice that is blind to the differences in human life. It is not that women are blind to justice; it is rather that "women bring to the life cycle a different point of view and order of human experience in terms of different priorities" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 22; italics added) . I understand this as suggesting that women (usually or mostly) configure their values differently than men do. When rights and care conflict, women tend to give more weight to care than men do. Of course, we should note that for Gilligan the "different voice" is characterized not by gender but by theme; its association with women is not absolute (Gilligan, 1982, p. 2 While it is not in itself a duty to share the sufferings (as well as the joys) of others, it is a duty to sympathize actively in their fate; and to this end it is therefore an indirect duty to cultivate the compassionate natural (aesthetic) feelings in us, and to make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on moral principles and the feelings appropriate to them.-It is therefore a duty not to avoid the places where the poor who lack the most basic necessities are to be found but rather to seek them out, and not to shun sickrooms or debtors' prisons and so forth in order to avoid sharing painful feelings one may not be able to resist. For this is still one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of duty alone might not accomplish. (Kant, 1996, p. 205) For Kant, sympathetic feelings as joy and sadness are "aesthetic (ästhetische)" because they are sensible feelings of pleasure or displeasure at other people's joy or suffering. He holds that we have a duty to foster two kinds of natural feelings, namely our feelings toward the beauty of nature and our feelings of sympathy toward fellow human beings. Kant distinguishes two kinds of reactions to others' joy and suffering. He calls the first kind mere "receptivity" to the feelings in common with others. It is the feelings that nature has implanted in us. The other kind is "the capacity and the will to share in others' feelings." The former is natural and therefore "unfree." The latter is "free" and is based on practical reason (Kant, 1996, pp. 204-5) .
Natural feelings themselves are not morally praiseworthy for Kant because they are not motivated by reason; they nevertheless can be cultivated to acquire moral worth because they can serve as a means to promote active and rational benevolence, which is found in the second kind of feelings. Kant calls our need to foster these feelings for the sake of rational benevolence "the duty of humanity."
In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant addresses a different kind of feeling. He says, "no kind of feeling, [even] under the name of practical or moral feeling may be assumed as prior to the moral law and as its basis." For Kant, "moral feeling" is different from natural feeling because moral feeling is produced by reason. However, Kant maintains that moral feeling "does not serve for an estimate of actions or as a basis of the objective moral law itself but only as an incentive to make this law itself a maxim" (Kant, 1956, pp. 78-79 [75-76] ). These feelings, both natural and moral as described by Kant, may not be equivalent to care in care ethics. They are, however, unmistakably of the same kind of predisposition in us on which the concept of care is based. What is relevant to my thesis here is that, regardless of the role that
Kant has assigned to these feelings, they are clearly of positive value in Kant's ethics. That is to say, even though these caring feelings are by no means configured in Kant's ethics as highly as they are in care ethics, they are nevertheless incorporated in Kant's ethics as a good thing to possess.
Unlike Gilligan, whose study is based on empirical observation, theories of justice ethics are mostly theoretical constructions, with little or no direct empirical support. While some of these philosophers did not incorporate care in their ethical systems, everyday experience tells us that, in real life, people who routinely practice justice ethics also care, even though they may not "care" as much as care ethicists do. If my above argument holds, we can say that it is not that care ethics entirely rejects justice, nor is that justice ethics completely rejects care; it is rather that, when care and justice compete, these two single-aspect perspectives (i.e., values) are configured differently in these two ethics. While care ethics gives a higher priority to care, justice ethics gives a higher priority to justice. In other words, care and justice as single-aspect perspectives are present in both care ethics and justice ethics. But care ethics and justice ethics are two configured perspectives. Care and justice as single-aspect perspectives are indeed compatible in the sense they can be incorporated into the same ethical system, as both care ethics and justice ethics incorporate care and justice. Care ethics and justice ethics, as two configured perspectives, however, are incompatible. They are incompatible because they give contradictory answers to the question of which single-aspect perspective is more important, similar to the two configured perspectives held respectively by the two team members in the above-mentioned airplane model example. When care and 235 justice compete or conflict, care ethics generally places care ahead of justice, whereas justice ethics generally places justice ahead of care. This, however, is not to say that care ethicists would always follow the requirement of care and would never follow the requirement of justice when the two conflict, or vice versa for justice ethicists. In some circumstances, the requirement of one is simply too overwhelming not to follow, as in a "life and death" situation; the person just has to follow that of care or justice in ways that he or she would not in cases where the two requirements are largely comparable.
The argument for the compatibility of care perspective and justice perspective as ethics relies on an equivocation of the two senses of "perspective." It has to take the fact that both care and justice (as would rather take rightness than life. (6A:10; Lau, 1970, p. 166, with revisions) It is not that Mencius did not prefer having both fish and bear's palm, and both life and rightness. The question is rather which to have when only one of these is possible. In cases like these, a person has to sacrifice one in order to obtain the other, and the sacrifice, no matter which one, results in tragedy.
Tragedy occurs when two good things of great magnitude on their rightful paths clash with each other and one cannot be obtained without sacrificing the other. In the above story, Shun made the ultimate choice in sacrificing his duty to his country in order to fulfill his obligation toward his father. Perhaps it will shed light on the issue if we compare Shun's situation with that of Antigone's. In Sophocles's tragedy Antigone, the heroine Antigone was faced with the ultimate dilemma. Her brother Polyneices was killed in an unsuccessful attack against his own city-state Thebes. Creon, the king, decreed that Polyneices's corpse was not to be buried as punishment to Polyneices's crime against the state. In Antigone's eyes, obeying the law of the state and not giving Polyneices a proper burial was to betray her brother (Sophocles, Antigone, line 57).
before his country (lines 182-83) and one should never make friends with those who act against the state (lines 187-88). Creon did not deny duties to one's friends and family, but took duties to the state as more important (lines 660-61). Haemon, Creon's son, recognized the rightfulness of the words of the king (the state), but he considered other words, namely those of the gods, on the importance of family relationships and the duty to preserve these relationships as well (lines 687-88). The Chorus Leader found that reasons for both sides were well presented (line 725). So, ultimately we are comparing two values pointing to opposing directions in this situation, the value of upholding the laws of the state and the value of preserving and protecting the integrity of family relationships portrayed as upholding the laws of the gods in Antigone.
To be sure, one can find much dissimilarity between the case of Shun and that of Antigone. What is relevant to our discussion is that both cases are about moral dilemmas resulting from two compelling obligations. The heroes had to make an "either-or" decision and, no matter which way they were to go, the outcome was to be fulfillment on the one hand and violation on the other. The decision, however, hinges on the individual's configuration of values. Both Shun (as portrayed by Mencius) and Antigone placed their obligation to the family before their obligation to the state when these two come into a mutually exclusive, ultimate clash.
There are of course situations where different values prescribe opposed actions, but they do not necessitate a tragic clash and do not force people to make an "either-or" choice with grave sacrifice as in the case above. Let us look at another passage of Mencius 5A:3.
Wan Zhang said, "Xiang devoted himself everyday to plotting against Shun's life. Why did Shun only banish him when he became Emperor?" "He enfeoffed him," said Mencius. "Some called this banishment." "Shun banished Gong Gong to You Zhou," said Wan Zhang, "and Huan Dou to Mount Cong; he banished San Miao to San Wei and killed Gong on Mount Yü. On these four culprits being punished, the people in the Empire bowed to his will with admiration in their hearts.
That was because he punished the wicked. Xiang was the most wicked of them all, yet he was enfeoffed in You Bi. What wrong had the people of You Bi done? Is that the way a benevolent man behaves? Others he punishes, but when it comes to his own brother he enfeoffs him instead." "A benevolent man never harbours anger or nurses a grudge against a brother. All he does is to love him. Because he loves him, he wishes him to enjoy rank; because he loves him, he wishes him to enjoy wealth. To enfeoff him in You Bi was to let him enjoy wealth and rank. If as Emperor he were to allow his brother to be a nobody, could that be described as loving him?" (Lau, 1970, pp. 140-41, with indicate. This whole arrangement was more like a moral rehabilitation program than a nepotistic practice.
In doing so, Shun successfully preserved the family relationship while giving Xiang a chance to return to his moral senses.
Against my above reading, it may be argued that Mencius himself did not agree to the notion that the emperor owns the entire country. It may be argued that Mencius could not accept that premise of the above argument and, therefore, the above defense does not work. I maintain that we should distinguish two issues here. The first issue is whether the notion of emperor's ownership of the country is justified. The second is whether Shun acted appropriately given the common understanding of his time. Mencius did not agree that the emperor owns the country; to the contrary, for him the people are more important than the emperor. This revolutionary Mencian philosophy, of course, came much later and cannot be expected to have had any effect prior to its time. Given that the emperor's ownership of the country was a widely accepted reality, it can still be said that Shun acted appropriately within the context of his perception of reality. Let me use an example to illustrate this point. We can agree that, if someone is the sole owner of a property, she can decide what to do with it by herself. If she co-owns the property, she should make decisions about it jointly with her co-owner(s). Furthermore, if she does not own the property, she should not meddle with it without appropriate authorization. Let us imagine that she and all people around her believe that she is the sole owner, even though for some unknown reason she in fact is only a co-owner (or even a non-owner). Now further imagine that she does something with the property, which is appropriate (e.g., a good business move) if she were the sole owner. In this circumstance, we can still in an important sense say that she has acted appropriately with the property as its sole owner, even though we may say the contrary if taken into consideration the fact that she is actually only a co-owner (or non-owner). But that is completely different from the case in which she acts as the sole owner even though she knows that she is not. In the same way, given the Confucian belief of how one should treat one's family and given the belief that the emperor owns the country, it can be said that Shun acted appropriately with his brother Xiang, even though in today's understanding as well as in Mencius's own philosophy the answer is to the contrary.
It should be noted that Confucians do not deny that there is a cost in pursuing their prioritized values. There is a cost involved in pursuing values because different single-aspect perspectives compete and sometimes work against one another. Embracing a configured perspective implies holding that the pursuit of certain values are worth the cost and implies willingness to accept incurred cost. In the case of Xiang, it is not that Mencius did not love the people of You Bi, or that he did not think that a moral brother would be preferable to the wicked Xiang, or that, other things being equal, enfeoffing a moral brother would be more just. It is rather because he highly values family relationships that he praises Shun's solution as an appropriate one under the circumstances, even though it was by no means without cost.
Care and justice do not always have to conflict, and care ethics and justice ethics may endorse the same course of action under some circumstances. But when the two values conflict, upholding one involves a cost on the other. It is on which course of action is more worthwhile that the two ethics part their ways.
Confucian ethicists are willing to pay more for justice than justice ethicists are in order to preserve family relationships. When we compare Confucian ethics and justice ethics, we should remember this crucial difference between the two ethical approaches. A careful reading of relevant passages in the Mencius shows that while Mencius embraces both care and justice as single-aspect perspectives, he does not embrace care ethics and justice ethics as configured perspectives. Mencius's ethic is best characterized as a care ethic, not a justice ethic or a mixed bag of these two ethics.
